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Abstract—We describe a novel protocol for computing the
egocentric betweenness centrality of a node when relevant edge
information is spread between two mutually distrusting parties
such as two telecommunications providers. While each node
belongs to one network or the other, its ego network might include
edges unknown to its network provider. We develop a protocol of
differentially-private mechanisms to hide each network’s internal
edge structure from the other; and contribute a new two-stage
stratified sampler for exponential improvement to time and space
efficiency. Empirical results on several open graph data sets
demonstrate practical relative error rates while delivering strong
privacy guarantees, such as 16% error on a Facebook data set.
Index Terms—Differential Privacy; Betweenness Centrality
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sets such as social, communication, and transport
networks are graph structured: people are nodes and their
interactions edges. Such graph structures are valuable for
understanding real-world properties. However, revealing the
graph or its statistics can cause privacy disclosure even with
anonymisation techniques [1]–[3]. Furthermore, for many cor-
porations, customer data is an asset they are reluctant to share.
This motivates interest in joint computation over databases
with limited exposure to sensitive information.
Differential privacy (DP) [4] guarantees that a release output
distribution does not change by more than a small multiplica-
tive factor under input data perturbation. We consider edge DP
wherein perturbations correspond to edge flips: the existence
of sensitive edges is not revealed by edge-DP release.
We envisage two (or more) networks controlled by different
corporations, such as telephone or email providers, or two
different social networks. The complete list of nodes (i.e.,
people) is public knowledge, but the individual connections
between them are not, so we consider edge DP in order
to hide the connection between the nodes in each network.
Each service provider knows the connections within its own
network, plus the connections between one of its members and
the outside (e.g., when they contact someone in a different
network), but not the internal connections in other networks.
We are the first to consider differentially-private computa-
tion of egocentric betweenness centrality (EBC) [5]. Infor-
mally, EBC measures the importance of a node as a link
between different parts of the graph. A node that forms a link
between otherwise-isolated parts of the network has high be-
tweenness centrality; a node that is simply an easily-bypassed
member of an interconnected network has a low betweenness
centrality. This is a property of the whole communication
graph: one service provider cannot compute it using its partial
view of the graph alone.
Betweenness centrality could be used in targeted advertising
or customer retention campaigns, as individuals with high EBC
have the capacity to transfer information from one community
to another. EBC is equally important in understanding and
combating the spread of misinformation or “fake news”: indi-
viduals with high EBC can be educated to be more discerning
about what they spread through the network, thereby mitigat-
ing spread of fake news. The difficulty of assessing misleading
political content and obstructing its spread has become one of
the most important research questions in online social network
analysis, to which even the networks themselves are devoting
significant research effort.1
We enable a network provider to compute the egocen-
tric betweenness centrality of a node, while requiring only
differentially-private information about internal connections to
be shared between networks. Our main contributions are:
1) We introduce a privacy preserving method to compute the
egocentric betweenness centrality of nodes in undirected
graphs. In this work the network has local connections,
while there are also inter-network connections.
2) We propose a two-stage sampling process that delivers a
simple approach to implement and exponential savings in
time and space over naı¨ve sampling from the exponential
mechanism directly.
3) We report on thorough experiments using a Facebook
graph data set on 63,000 nodes. The experiments in
Section VI show that the error is approximately 16% of
the true EBC for reasonable values of privacy level .
Similar results hold for other networks from Enron and
PGP email.
First we survey the technical background and give a precise
definition of EBC. We then explain why a precise com-
putation would expose individual links between networks.
Section V describes our differentially-private mechanism for
communicating enough information between networks to per-
mit effective approximation of EBC while preserving strong
privacy guarantees. We then present empirical results testing
the feasibility of our approach on samples of public data from
Facebook, Enron and PGP.
1https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/new-elections-initiative/
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A. Related Work
k-anonymity [6] represents a major, early attempt at pre-
venting node and edge re-identification by graph transforma-
tion, but it has been proven to be insufficient [7].
Differential privacy for graph processing was first intro-
duced in [8] and was followed up by further work [9]–[12].
Two main privacy models exist when publishing graph-based
information under differential privacy; node [10] and edge dif-
ferential privacy [8]. Hay et al. [8] introduced an algorithm for
publishing degree distributions under edge privacy, implicitly
permitting private K-star counting as well. Projection-based
techniques have been proposed to answer degree distribution
queries under node differential privacy [13], [14].
Other statistics have been approximated under differential
privacy such as frequent patterns of given sub graphs [9], [15],
[16]. Bhaskar et al. [15] used the exponential mechanism to
publish the (approximately) most frequent patterns with high
probability, and the Laplace mechanism to release the noisy
frequency of maximising patterns. Karawa et al. [16] proposed
a differentially-private algorithm to output answers to sub-
graph counting queries for K-star, K-triangle sub graphs while
using local sensitivity [17] to overcome high global sensitivity
in sub-graph counting queries. An approach to finding arbitrary
frequent patterns was proposed by Shen & Yu [12]. They
utilise the exponential mechanism and Markov chain Monte
Carlo sampling to output frequent patterns on graph data sets.
Finding node clusters in a single graph under differential
privacy was first proposed by [11] and followed by [18]. These
techniques try to find the group of nodes sharing many links
with other nodes in the same group but relatively few outside
the group. They maintain the privacy of the output clusters
under node or edge differential privacy.
Our work differs from previous studies in two key ways.
First we focus on the problem of node influence, through
the study of ego betweenness centrality. This particular task
poses significant technical challenges, made efficient here
by adopting two-stage stratified and accept-reject sampling.
Second we consider a core graph processing task in a dis-
tributed two-party setting. While most existing work on graph
mining under differential privacy can adopt a model of trusted
computation, and there is some work on privacy for distributed
systems [19], [20], these are based on distributed queries that
are decomposed into sub-queries, each answered per database.
Our setting requires untrusting parties to cooperate on compu-
tation without revealing one another’s privacy-sensitive data.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Egocentric Betweenness Centrality
First proposed by Everett & Borgatti [21] as an approxima-
tion to betweenness centrality [22], egocentric betweenness
centrality (EBC) has gained recognition in its own right
as a natural measure of a node’s importance as a network
bridge [23]. The EBC of a node a is the sum, for all pairs of
neighbours of a that aren’t directly connected, of the fraction
of 2-edge paths between them that pass through a.
Definition 1. Egocentric betweenness centrality (EBC) of
node a in simple undirected graph (V,E) is defined as
EBC(a) =
∑
i,j∈Na:Aij=0,j>i
1
A2ij
,
where Na = {v ∈ V | {v, a} ∈ E} denotes the neighbour-
hood or ego network of a, A denotes the (|Na|+1)×(|Na|+1)
adjacency matrix induced by Na ∪ {a} with Aij = 1 if
{i, j} ∈ E and 0 otherwise; A2ij denotes the ij-th entry of
the matrix square, guaranteed positive for all i, j ∈ Na since
all such nodes are connected through a.
B. Differential Privacy on Graphs
Differential privacy was proposed to quantify the indistin-
guishability of input databases when observing the output of
data analysis [4]. With careful selection of which databases are
to be indistinguishable—through the so-called neighbouring
relation—the protective semantics of differential privacy may
be controlled.
As detailed further in Section III, our concern is maintaining
the privacy of connections in networks, e.g., who calls whom
in a telecommunications network. We therefore use edge
privacy [8] and so relate graphs that differ by edges. The
adjacency matrix fully represents the edgeset of a graph of
known nodes (the indices into the adjacency matrix). As such,
we focus on databases as sequences of bits: elements of
{0, 1}n.
Formally, two databases D,D′ ∈ {0, 1}n and are termed
neighbouring (denoted D ∼ D′) if there exists exactly one
i ∈ [n] such that Di 6= D′i and Dj = D′j for all j ∈ [n]\{i}.
In other words, ‖D −D′‖1 = 1.
Definition 2. For  > 0, a randomised algorithm on databases
or mechanism A is said to preserve -differential privacy
if for any two neighbouring databases D,D′, and for any
measurable set R ⊆ Range(A),
Pr (A(D) ∈ R) ≤ exp() · Pr (A(D′) ∈ R) .
1) Generic Mechanisms for Privacy: We leverage two well-
known DP mechanisms in this paper: the Laplace mecha-
nism [4] which applies additive noise to numeric vector-valued
analyses, and the exponential mechanism [24] which privately
optimises a real-valued objective function bivariate in the
database and the decision variable which need not be numeric.
Common to most generic mechanisms, and the Laplace and ex-
ponential in particular, is the concept of sensitivity-calibrated
randomisation: the more sensitive a target function is to input
perturbation, the more randomisation is required to attain a
level of differential privacy. Both mechanisms leveraged here
are calibrated via the same measure of sensitivity, defined next.
Definition 3. The L1-global sensitivity of any function
f : {0, 1}n → Rd for any d ∈ N, is defined as
∆f ≥ sup
D,D′∈{0,1}n,D∼D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1 .
2
For functions of additional variables f : {0, 1}n × Θ → Rd
we extend this definition naturally as
∆f ≥ sup
θ∈Θ
sup
D,D′∈{0,1}n,D∼D′
‖f(D, θ)− f(D′, θ)‖1 .
We can now define the aforementioned generic mechanisms.
Lemma 4. Consider any Euclidean vector-valued determinis-
tic function f : {0, 1}n → Rd for any d ∈ N, and any scalar
 > 0. Given input D ∈ {0, 1}n, the Laplace mechanism
releases responses in Rd distributed as f(D) +X where X
is d i.i.d. zero-mean Laplace2 r.v.’s with scale ∆f/. Then the
Laplace mechanism preserves -differential privacy.
Lemma 5. Consider any real-valued bivariate quality func-
tion q : {0, 1}n × Θ → R, which assigns quality score
q(D, θ) to candidate response θ ∈ Θ, on input database
D ∈ {0, 1}n. The exponential mechanism approximately
maximises q(D, ·) by releasing randomised response θ with
likelihood proportional to exp(q(D, θ) · /(2 ·∆q)). Then the
exponential mechanism preserves -differential privacy.
2) Compositional Calculus: In order to build up more
complex privacy-preserving computations, it is necessary to be
able to quantify the privacy loss of compositions. Fortunately,
differential privacy satisfies sequential composition and trans-
formation invariance [4], [25], [26] among other compositions.
Lemma 6 (Sequential composition). For any sequence of
randomised mechanisms A1,A2, . . . ,Ak, if each Ai pre-
serves i-differential privacy then the compound response on
a database D, (A1(D), . . . ,Ak(D)), preserves
(∑k
i=1 i
)
-
differential privacy.
Lemma 7 (Transformation invariance). For any mechanism
A1 that is -differentially private, and any (possibly ran-
domised) mapping A2 with domain containing the co-domain
of A1, the randomised mechanism A = A2 ◦ A1 preserves
-differential privacy.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a two-party setting of a telecommunications net-
work with two service providers X,Y : every customer is
represented as a node a that belongs to one and only one
service provider; pairs of customers who e.g., have called one
another are represented as edges in a simple undirected graph
on the disjoint union of nodes. Edges can either connect nodes
within one party (X or Y ) in which case are unknown to the
other party (Y or X respectively), or edges span both parties
and are known to both. We consider all nodes to be known to
both parties, as being addressable within a global addressing
system (e.g., a phone book).
Denote by VX , VY the nodes of X,Y respectively, EX ⊆
VX , EY ⊆ VY the edges (two-element sets) within parties
X,Y respectively, and EXY ⊆ VX ∪ VY the edges spanning
X,Y as sets with one element each from VX , VY . The simple
2The zero-mean scalar Laplace with scale λ > 0 has PDF
(2λ)−1 exp(−|x|/λ).
TABLE I
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS USED IN THIS PAPER.
X,Y The two parties e.g., competing service providers.
VX , VY The nodes per party.
EX , EY Edges entirely within each party.
EXY Edges spanning both parties.
a The ego node (assumed WLOG to be in X).
Na The ego network of a.
X- Party X’s nodes VX excluding a.
R? The ego network contained in X .
Tij Counts of 2-paths spanning X,Y .
SX , SY , SXY Partial EBC sums by endpoints.
R A private, randomised approximation to R?.
Qi For i ∈ {0, . . . , |X-|}, a partition of P (X-).
 The differential-privacy budget.
∆ A global sensitivity bound.
undirected graph on the entire network comprises node-set
disjoint union VX ∪ VY and edge-set disjoint union EX ∪
EY ∪ EXY . Note we will often equivalently represent edge
sets as adjacency matrices (or flattened vectors) with elements
in {0, 1}. Table I shows all of the symbols used in this paper.
We wish to enable one party (without loss of generality)
X to compute the ego betweenneess centrality (EBC) of one
of its nodes a ∈ VX , while maintaining edge privacy between
parties. Before detailing a protocol for accomplishing this task,
we must be precise about a privacy model.
Problem 8 (Private Two-Party EBC). Consider a simple
undirected graph (VX ∪ VY , EX ∪ EY ∪ EXY ) partitioned
by parties X,Y as above, and an arbitrary node a ∈ VX . The
problem of private two-party egocentric betweenness centrality
is for the parties X,Y to collaboratively approximate EBC(a)
under assumptions that:
A1. Both parties X,Y know the entire node set VX ∪ VY ;
A2. Each party knows every edge incident to nodes within
their own network. That is, X knows EX ∪ EXY while
Y knows EY ∪ EXY ; and
A3. The computed EBC(a) needs to be available to X but
need not be shared with Y .
Any solution must not reveal to X,Y what is not already
known except for X discovering EBC(a) (Assumption 3). We
seek solutions under an honest-but-curious adversarial model:
while X,Y will follow any agreed upon protocol prescribing
computations to take and messages to send to one-another,
without attempting to manipulate the other party; each party
is curious about the other’s edges and may apply arbitrary
auxiliary computation and leverage data sources in attempting
to discover the other’s edges. Formally, what is revealed by X
(Y ) to Y (respectively X) must preserve -differential privacy
with respect to EX (respectively EY ).
IV. WARM-UP: A NON-PRIVATE PROTOCOL
We first consider how X,Y might cooperate without pre-
serving differential privacy. In particular X cannot itself count
2-paths that are
3
Party X Party Y
Ego network in X
Counts of two-hop paths
Partial EBC
Final EBC computation
Fig. 1. EBC two-party computation protocol, comprising one forward and
two backward messages.
• Contained entirely within Y ; or
• Ending in both X,Y with intermediate node in Y .
Any protocol must involve Y in aggregating over such paths.
But while the first case can be aggregated independently by
Y , the second case requires X to communicate its endpoint
neighbours of a to Y . This significantly complicates the
differentially-private solution developed in the next section.
Recall that Na = {v ∈ V | {v, a} ∈ E} denotes the ego
network of a anywhere in the graph (notably not including a
since the graph has no self-loops). Figure 1 summarises the
following protocol.
Protocol 9. Proceeding in sequence:
i. [Forward message] X sends to Y the set R? = Na ∩ VX
of neighbours of a contained within X;
ii. [Backward message] Y computes and sends to X , for
each i ∈ R? and for each j ∈ Na∩VY (where i, j are not
directly connected), a count Tij of 2-paths with endpoints
i, j and intermediate point in Na ∩ VY ;
iii. [Backward message] Y computes and sends to X , the
EBC partial sum over endpoint nodes i, j ∈ Na ∩ VY
with intermediate nodes in Na ∪ {a}. That is, SY =∑
i,j∈Na∩VY :Aij=0,j>i 1/A
2
ij;
iv. X increments the received Tij by the number of 2-paths
between i, j with intermediate point in R? ∪ {a}. It then
sets SXY to the sum of their reciprocals;
v. X computes, over distinct and disconnected end-
point nodes i, j ∈ R? with intermediate node in
Na ∪ {a}, the EBC partial sum. That is: SX =∑
i,j∈R?:Aij=0,j>i 1/A
2
ij; and
vi. X completes computation of EBC(a) as SX+SXY +SY .
Remark 10. We now briefly comment on where edge privacy
is potentially breached, thereby highlighting challenges faced
by any solution to Problem 8. When X sends Y its set of
neighbours R? of a, party Y learns directly of all edges
incident to a in X . When Y sends X its 2-path counts
Tij , while counts aggregate exact connectivity at worst this
level of aggregation could be very small therefore revealing
information about connections to a within Y , and the inter-
connections between these nodes. A worst case occurs when
there are two nodes in Y connected to a: as soon as X receives
the vector of counts of 2-paths spanning X,Y , it can learn
whether these two nodes are connected.
V. A PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOL
We now develop our protocol for private EBC which
involves a series of differentially-private mechanisms for over-
coming the privacy disclosures identified in Remark 10. We
relegate proofs to the Appendices.
We use the exponential mechanism (viz. Lemma 5) to
release a set R of nodes in X that privately approximates a’s
ego network R? in X . This is Protocol 9.i’s ‘forward message’
(Section V-A).
While our application of the exponential mechanism pro-
tects edge privacy for X , there is still potential for privacy
disclosure when Y communicates counts to X . To overcome
this problem, we leverage the Laplace mechanism to privatise
vectors of 2-path counts communicated by Y within Proto-
col 9.ii’s ‘backward message’ (Section V-B). The components
of this message are indexed (in part) by the approximate
R ≈ R? sent in the forward message. A second Laplace
mechanism makes private the partial EBC of Protocol 9.iii’s
‘backward message’.
In this way our privacy-preserving protocol follows the
broad-brush sequence of steps outlined in Section IV but is
made more involved by the addition of differential privacy.
A. Forward Message
The goal of the forward message, is to communicate a
privacy-preserving approximation to R? = Na ∩ VX chosen
from power set P (VX\{a}). In order to leverage the expo-
nential mechanism (viz. Lemma 5) we must specify a quality
function of the form q : {0, 1}|VX |2 ×P (VX\{a})→ R. That
is a mapping from the VX ×VX adjacency matrix for EX and
a candidate response R ⊆ VX\{a}, to a score reflecting the
approximation quality of R? by R. Since the response set is
finite (albeit exponential in the graph size), the exponential
mechanism then has normalised response probability mass
function,
exp(q(R) · /(2 ·∆q))∑
S⊆X exp(q(S) · /(2 ·∆q))
, (1)
with implicit dependency on fixed EX adjacency matrix.
In designing an appropriate quality function, we typically
want q to be maximised uniquely by the desired non-private
output R?. The function should also be a semantically mean-
ingful ‘distance’ between outputs R and R? such that the
utility bounds for the exponential mechanism of [24, Lemma
7 and Theorem 8] make meaningful guarantees. The utility
guarantee states that with high probability the released random
R has q score not too much lower than maxS⊆VX\{a} q(S).
And so if R? meets this global maximum, then we have that
the released set has score not much lower than that of R?.
4
If responses close in q are also ‘close’ then this guarantees a
good approximation to R? with high probability.
Remark 11. A natural choice for quality function is q(R) =
|R ∩ R?| as it is clearly maximised by R?. However it is
not uniquely maximised, indeed for any superset R? ⊂ S ⊆
VX\{a} (including the entire set of nodes) we have that
q(S) = |S ∩ R?| = |R?| also. There are many such sets:
2|VX |−1−|R
?| which is not far from the number of all possible
responses 2|VX |−1 for modest ego network sizes, in which case
the exponential mechanism does not achieve our goal.
Section V-A1 develops a sound choice of quality function
in the symmetric set difference.
In the rest of this section we will abuse notation and
abbreviate X = VX with the meaning understood from
context. We will also denote by X- = VX\{a}.
1) Symmetric Set Difference: We adopt (for minimisation)
the symmetric set difference with R? given by (R\R?) ∪
(R?\R) as a promising basis for quality function design.
Define complements B = X-\B relative to X-. We have
(R\R?) ∪ (R?\R) = X-\ ((R ∩R?) ∪R ∪R?) ; and
|(R\R?) ∪ (R?\R)| = |X-| − |R ∩R?| − |R ∪R?| ,
where the second equality follows from a disjoint union in the
first equality’s right-hand side.
In minimising the symmetric difference, dismissing the con-
stant |X-| as redundant to optimisation, we can equivalently
maximise3
q(R) = |R ∩R?|+ |R ∪R?| . (2)
This quality function takes values in {0, . . . , |X-|} and is
uniquely maximised by R?.
While the machinery of the exponential mechanism only
requires sensitivity of this quality function (Section V-A5)
to guarantee differential privacy, a significant challenge is
involved in sampling from the mechanism’s response distri-
bution as it is defined over an enormous response space:
the power set of X-. Thanks to the amplification of q by
the exponential, the distribution’s mass varies an incredible
amount even for graphs of modest size.
2) Equi-Quality Responses: It will be useful to consider
the sets of candidate exponential mechanism responses, with
equal quality score value i,
Qi = {R ⊆ X- : q(r) = i} ,
where i ∈ {0, . . . , |X-|}. It can be shown that the Qi form
a partition of P (X-): the sets are pairwise disjoint, and their
union is all subsets of X-. It can also be shown that for i ∈
{0, . . . , |X-|},
|Qi| =
i∑
k=0
(|R?|
k
)(|X-| − |R?|
i− k
)
=
(|X-|
i
)
.
3While q’s dependence on R? is suppressed, it should be implicitly
understood.
A consequence of this identity is an efficient approach to
computing the normalising constant for the exponential mech-
anism response distribution. The proof can be found in the
Appendices.
Corollary 12. Consider the normalised exponential mecha-
nism response distribution (1) for the quality function given
in (2). The normalising constant is equivalent to
C =
|X|∑
i=1
|Qi| exp
(
i · 
2∆
)
.
Computing this expression takes time and space O(|X|).
Note that other phases of our protocol, to be specified,
also require linear space. By comparison computing C naı¨vely
would take time exponential in X and constant space.
3) Two-Stage Sampling: We will now outline how to sam-
ple from the exponential mechanism response distribution,
using a two-stage sampling process that delivers a simple
approach to implement, and exponential savings in time and
space vs naı¨ve sampling from the exponential mechanism.
Remark 13. Another standard approach to sampling from
challenging distributions is acceptance-rejection sampling or
the Metropolis algorithm. However no clear surrogate prob-
ability mass presents itself that yields acceptable rates of
rejection for practical applicability.
a) Stratified Sampling: To simplify notation, let us con-
sider the problem at-hand more generally: let V ∈ V be a
discrete random variable on finite probability space (p,V) i.e.,
a multinomial with p : v ∈ V 7→ Pr(V = v). Suppose there
exists a partition of V into the disjoint union of V0, . . . ,Vk,
such that for all i, and all v, v′ ∈ Vi, p(v) = p(v′) i.e., the
probability mass is constant within each part. We can exactly
sample from V ∼ p by (1) drawing a random variable that
selects a part in the partition according to the relative part sizes
then (2) sampling uniformly from within the chosen part—this
is the approach taken by Algorithm 1 FORWARDMESSAGE.
Denote by pi the constant probability mass p(v) of any v ∈ Vi.
The following result is proven in the Appendices.
Lemma 14. Define random variable I ∈ {0, . . . , k} where
Pr(I = i) ∝ |Vi| · pi for each i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, and U ∼
Unif (VI) | I . Then Pr(V = v) = Pr(U = v) for all v ∈ V .
Moreover, the probability mass stated for Pr(I = i) is already
normalised, i.e., Pr(I = i) = |Vi| · pi.
Corollary 15. The following sampling process, implemented
in FORWARDMESSAGE Algorithm 1, is equivalent to sampling
R from the exponential mechanism (1)
(i) Sample I ∈ {0, . . . , |X-|} with log-space probability mass
log Pr(I = i)
=
{
−|X-| log (1 + exp ( 2∆)) , i = 0
log(|X-| − i+ 1)− log i+ log Pr(I = i− 1), o.w.
(ii) Sample R ∼ Unif (QI) | I
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Algorithm 1 FORWARDMESSAGE Two-Stage Sampler
Input: edge set EX ; ego node a ∈ VX ; ,∆ > 0
1: R? ←− {v ∈ VX | {v, a} ∈ EX}
2: X- ←− VX\{a}
3: I ←− INVERSETRANSFORMSAMPLER(|X-|, ,∆)
4: R←− PICKANDFLIPSAMPLER(X-, R?, I)
5: return R
Algorithm 2 INVERSETRANSFORMSAMPLER
Input: cardinality |X-|; ,∆ > 0
// Compute log-space PDF of I
1: p0 ←− −|X-| log
(
1 + exp
(

2∆
))
2: for i ∈ [|X-|] do
3: pi ←− pi−1 + log(|X-| − i+ 1)− log i
4: end for
// Search in CDF for random quantile
5: ψ ←− −Exp(1)
6: c←− p0
7: for I ∈ [|X-|] do
8: if c ≥ ψ then
9: return I − 1
10: end if
11: c←− log(exp(c) + exp(pI))
12: end for
13: return I
Proof: As the exponential mechanism (1) on R ∈ P (X-),
with quality function (2), is a multinomial distribution with
strata of constant probability given by the Qi, Lemma 14
establishes that the stratified sampler successfully implements
the mechanism. All that remains is to compute the probability
of selecting Qi as the stratum’s cardinality times constant
probability (normalised by C as given in Corollary 12).
Pr(I = i) = |Qi| ·
exp
(
i·
2∆
)
C
=
(|X-|
i
)
exp
(
i·
2∆
)(
1 + exp
(

2∆
))|X-| ,
where the final equality follows from the observation that
the expression for C is a Binomial expansion. We simplify
and convert this expression to log-space as the expression
exponentially increases in i:
log Pr(I = i)
= log
(|X-|
i
)
+
i · 
2∆
− |X-| log
(
1 + exp
( 
2∆
))
=
{
−|X-| log (1 + exp ( 2∆)) , i = 0
log(|X-| − i+ 1)− log i+ log Pr(I = i− 1), i > 0,
completing the result.
4) Linear-Complexity Sampling: While Corollary 15 re-
duces the problem from sampling from a large support set
with highly skewed probability mass, we must address efficient
implementation of the two-stage sampling.
a) Inverse Transform Sampling of I: The sampling of
multinomial I over much smaller support set {0, . . . , |X-|}
Algorithm 3 PICKANDFLIPSAMPLER
Input: node set X-; node set R? ⊆ X-; I ∈ {0, . . . , |X-|}
1: R←− R?
2: V1, . . . , V|X-|−I ∼ Unif (X-) without replacement
3: for j ∈ [|X-| − I] do
4: if Vj ∈ R then
5: R←− R\{Vj}
6: else
7: R←− R ∪ {Vj}
8: end if
9: end for
10: return R
can be accomplished efficiently via inverse transform sam-
pling. Given access to a random variable Z’s (invertible)
CDF FZ , one can sample realisations of Z by first sampling
ψ ∼ Unif ([0, 1]) then releasing quantile F−1Z (ψ). For Z ∈ Z,
we can always take F−1Z (ψ) = inf{z ∈ Z | Fz(z) ≥ ψ}.
However highly-skewed distributions can suffer from numeric
instability in floating-point computation of the CDF. Though
not as severe as for R, this remains a problem for I . To combat
this we employ a library for arbitrary floating-point precision
in our implementation (see Section VI) and we represent I’s
probability mass in log space as reported in Corollary 15. In
this case, the inverse transform sampler is easily adapted as
proved in the Appendices.
Proposition 16. Consider r.v. I defined in Corollary 15.
It can be sampled via the INVERSETRANSFORMSAMPLER
(Algorithm 2) in time and space O(|X-|) given oracle access
to exponential r.v.’s.
b) Pick-and-Flip Sampling of R: After sampling I , we
must sample R uniformly from within chosen stratum QI ,
a constrained and potentially large subset of P (X-). For
sampled R we are to have q(R) = |R ∩R?|+ |R ∪R?| = I ,
so the size of R and R?’s symmetric set difference is |X-|−I .
Moreover, this describes all candidates for R within QI .
Proposition 17. If r.v. I is sampled with INVERSETRANS-
FORMSAMPLER (Algorithm 2), then Algorithm 3 PICKAND-
FLIPSAMPLER yields a sample of r.v. R defined in Corol-
lary 15 in time and space O(|X-|).
Proof: Every time a new node Vj sampled from X-, it
could be sampled from either X-\R? or R?. In both cases, Vj
is added to the set difference. This loop invariance continues
until the set difference size reaches |X-| − I establishing R ∈
QI and uniformly so due to the uniform sampling of the Vj .
Sampling the nodes (like the rest of the algorithm) can be
achieved in linear time/space with Fisher-Yates shuffling.
5) Quality Function Global Sensitivity: The remaining in-
gredient for invoking the exponential mechanism to privately
release R ≈ R? = Na ∩ VX , is bounding q’s sensitivity.
Lemma 18. Consider any fixed R ⊆ X- and X-contained
ego networks R?, R?′ induced by neighbouring adjacency
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Algorithm 4 BACKWARDMESSAGE
Input: ego node a ∈ VX ; edge sets EXY , EY ; private node
set R ⊆ VX\{a}; ,∆1,∆2 > 0
// Count 2-paths of type X − Y − Y
1: for i ∈ R and j ∈ Na ∩ VY do
2: K ←− {k ∈ Na ∩ VY | {i, k} ∈ EXY , {k, j} ∈ EY }
3: Tij ←− |K|+ Lap(2∆1/)
4: end for
// Partial EBC sum over 2-paths in Y
5: E′Y ←− EXY ∪ EY
6: SY ←− 0.
7: for i, j ∈ Na ∩ VY with j > i and {i, j} /∈ EY do
8: K ←− {k ∈ R∪{a}∪(Na∩VY ) | {i, k}, {k, j} ∈ E′Y }
9: SY ←− SY + 1|K|
10: end for
11: SY ←− SY + Lap(2∆2/)
12: return T, SY
matrices on EX and fixed ego node a. Noting explicitly the
dependence of the quality function (2) on non-private ego
network, |q(R,R?)− q(R,R?′)| ≤ 1.
Proof: Consider the effect of switching an edge within X
on the symmetric difference cardinality between R,R? i.e., the
quality function. Adding/removing an edge can impact at most
one node being neighbours with ego node a; it can therefore
only decrease or increase the first or second terms of q by
1, at most. Since these two sets are disjoint, it cannot change
both simultaneously.
Theorem 19. FORWARDMESSAGE (Algorithm 1) takes time
and space O(|X-|), and when run with ∆ = 1, preserves
-differential privacy of the edge set EX within party X’s
network.
Proof: Privacy follows from Lemma 5, Corollary 15 and
Lemma 18, complexity from Propositions 16 and 17.
B. Backward Message
Analogous to the non-private protocol of Section IV (Fig-
ure 1), Y receives node-set R approximating a’s ego network
in X , via FORWARDMESSAGE. Subsequently, Y must send
back: counts Tij of 2-paths spanning X,Y with intermediate
node in Y—indexed by R; and its partial EBC sum SY
over paths with endpoints in Y and intermediate node in
R ∪ {a} ∪ (Na ∩ VY ). Note this last set is the private
appoximation to Na∪{a}. We apply in BACKWARDMESSAGE
(Algorithm 4) the Laplace mechanism (Lemma 4) to both
backward message components to avoid disclosure of edges
EY in Y .
Note cases in which BACKWARDMESSAGE need not be run
by X: If |Na ∩VY | ≤ 1 there are no paths incident to Y with
intermediate point in Y ; or contained entirely within Y . We
may therefore assume within the algorithm that these cases
are not present.
Algorithm 5 PRIVATEEBC
Input: node sets VX and VY ; T ; SY ; ego node a ∈ VX ; edge
sets EXY , EY
// Party X runs:
1: R←− FORWARDMESSAGE(EX , a, ,∆0)
2: Send R to party Y
// Party Y runs:
3: T, SY ←− BACKWARDMESSAGE(a,EXY , EY , R, ,∆1,∆2)
4: Send T, SY to party X
// Party X runs:
5: SXY ←− 0
6: for i ∈ R? and j ∈ Na ∩ VY where {i, j} /∈ EXY do
7: K ←− {k ∈ R? ∪ {a} | {i, k} ∈ EX , {k, j} ∈ EXY }
8: if i /∈ R then
9: Tij ←− 0
10: end if
11: Tij ←− Tij + |K|
12: SXY ←− SXY + 1Tij
13: end for
14: SX ←− 0
15: for i, j ∈ R? where j > i and {i, j} /∈ EX do
16: K ←− {k ∈ Na ∪ {a} | {i, k} ∈ EX , {k, j} ∈ EX}
17: SX ←− SX + 1|K|
18: end for
19: return SX + SXY + SY to party X
1) Privately Counting Paths: The first part of the backward
message compares the Tij—noisy counts of 2-paths with inter-
mediate node in Na∩VY —over i in the given R approximating
R?, and j ∈ Na ∩ VY . The sensitivity of these counts relates
to adding or removing an edge in EXY , as follows, with proof
given in the Appendices.
Lemma 20. Let query f denote the vector-valued non-private
response T. The L1-global sensitivity of f is upper-bounded
by ∆f = 2|R|.
2) Private Partial EBC: The second part of BACK-
WARDMESSAGE is a partial EBC sum over 2-paths with
end-points in Na ∩ VY (and intermediate point in either the
same or R ∪ {a}) as in Protocol 9.iii. We again apply the
Laplace mechanism to avoid privacy disclosure of edges in
Y , which requires bounding sensitivity of the non-private sum
as follows. The proof can be found in the Appendices.
Lemma 21. Let query f ′ denote the partial EBC sum over
2-paths with end-points i, j ∈ Na∩VY and intermediate node
k ∈ (Na ∩ VY ) ∪ R ∪ {a}. Then the L1-global sensitivity of
f ′ is upper-bounded by ∆f ′ = |Na ∩ VY | − 1.
As both applications of the Laplace mechanism run with
privacy budget /2, Lemma 6 implies overall EY edge privacy
is guaranteed.
Corollary 22. BACKWARDMESSAGE (Algorithm 4) takes time
and space O(max{|R|, N} · N) where N = |Na ∩ VY |,
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Fig. 2. Experimental results for Facebook, Enron and PGP data sets.
and when run with ∆1 = 2|R|,∆2 = N − 1, preserves -
differential privacy of edge set EY within party Y ’s network.
C. PRIVATEEBC: Putting it All Together
After parties X and Y have respectively run FOR-
WARDMESSAGE and BACKWARDMESSAGE, X must com-
plete the computation of the private EBC. As shown in Algo-
rithm 5, PRIVATEEBC comprises two phases that closely mir-
ror the two components of BACKWARDMESSAGE: counting
2-paths spanning X,Y , and counting 2-paths with endpoints
in X .
Within the first stage we incorporate BACKWARDMESSAGE
noisy counts Tij contributed by Y , which count paths having
intermediate nodes in Y . Party X simply increments these
values with counts of paths having endpoints in X . The sum
reciprocals forms SXY . We make one optimisation to utility
at no cost to privacy: counts Tij for i ∈ R\R? are discarded.
A straightforward sum of paths with endpoints in X and
intermediate points in Na ∪ {a} completes SX . Finally party
X completes PRIVATEEBC by summing the partial EBCs.
Remark 23. We opt to use the same  privacy budget
for both parties X (Theorem 19) and Y (Corollary 22) in
PRIVATEEBC out of symmetry. However the algorithm can
operate with separate budgets if desired.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
To empirically validate the effectiveness of PRIVATEEBC
we ran experiments on three graph data sets: a Facebook
friendship graph [27] with 63,731 vertices and 817,035 edges;
the Enron email network [28] with 36,692 nodes and 183,831
edges; and the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [27] data set with
10,680 users as vertices and 24,316 inter-user interactions as
edges. We follow a random process to partition the nodes,
while the structure of the graph stays intact: nodes are assigned
to parties X or Y independently and uniformly at random,
while edges are not changed.
The experiments were run on a server with 2 × 28 core
Xeon’s (112 threads with hyper threading) and 1.5 TB RAM,
using Python 3.7 without parallel computations for fair com-
parison. We use relative error between true and private EBC—
the lower the relative error the higher the utility. We employed
the Mpmath arbitrary precision library and set the precision to
300 bits. Arbitrary precision is vital for implementing inverse
transform sampling as described in Section V-A4.
VII. RESULTS
We first examine the relationship between utility and privacy
for PRIVATEEBC. For 60 uniformly-at-random ego nodes
selected from randomly-partitioned party X , we report average
relative error (comparing private and true EBC) for a range of
privacy levels  between 0.1 and 7. Figure 2(a)—2(c) show the
results for the three datasets, where it is apparent that average
relative error decreases dramatically when  is increased to 1,
and stays very small for larger . For  > 0.5, average relative
error is usually below 50%. And at the strong guarantee of
 = 1.5 the average relative error is 16% (Facebook) 47%
(Enron) and 25% (PGP).
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As we have employed three different privacy-preserving
mechanisms in our proposed protocol—one exponential
(Mech1) and two Laplace (Mech2, Mech3)—we examine each
separately to evaluate how they affect overall relative error.
Specifically, we run the PRIVATEEBC protocol with only
one of the privacy-preserving mechanisms intact and use the
non-private version for remaining mechanisms, with each of
Mech1–Mech3 taking turns being private. In this way we
can isolate the incremental cost to utility of each mechanism.
Figure 2(d) reports the results on Facebook, which demonstrate
that Mech1 FORWARDMESSAGE has the least impact on
the relative error while Mech3 BACKWARDMESSAGE second
component, has the highest impact. This suggest future work
may focus on the third mechanism.
We next report on timing analysis for PRIVATEEBC as
function of privacy level. Median computation time of 20
random ego nodes for  from 0.1 to 7 is reported in Figure 2(e)
on Facebook data. Here total time is overall decreasing as
privacy decreases (increasing ), while a small increase to
runtime can be seen at very high levels of privacy (low but
increasing ). This dual effect is slightly more pronounced on
Enron and PGP (see the Appendices), and is likely due to
different behaviours in the protocol with increasing . When
the set difference of R and R? is small, the two-stage sampler
generates just small numbers of nodes in faster time. However
faster runtime with lower privacy dominates behaviour overall.
Moreover any effect of privacy is not strong, with at most a
5× change in runtime which across data sets is practical at
under 10 min (median) on the larger data sets.
Figure 2(f) shows how the relative error between true and
private EBC varies by ego node degree. We report results
on  = 1, which do not show significant dependence: for
node degrees up to 102, deviation is approximately 7% of
the maximum relative error which is low.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have developed the PRIVATEEBC al-
gorithm which comprises a protocol of differentially-private
mechanisms for cooperative 2-party computation of egocen-
tric betweenness centrality. Theoretical and empirical results
demonstrate that our approach achieves strong privacy guar-
antees for both parties which achieving practical levels of
utility with efficient time and space complexity. Notably we
contribute a novel two-stage sampler that improves upon the
exponential mechanism’s time and space complexities expo-
nentially. PRIVATEEBC should extend naturally to multiple
networks—we expect to add to our empirical investigations
of efficiency in that case. It would be interesting to extend
differential privacy to the case in which the answer needs to
be returned by the party whose node is being queried to some
untrusted authority.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Corollary 12
Consider the denominator of the exponential response dis-
tribution (1):
C =
∑
R⊆X
exp
(
q(R) · 
2∆
)
=
|X|∑
i=1
∑
R∈Qi
exp
(
q(R) · 
2∆
)
=
|X|∑
i=1
∑
R∈Qi
exp
(
i · 
2∆
)
=
|X|∑
i=1
|Qi| exp
(
i · 
2∆
)
,
establishing the result.
B. Proof of Lemma 14
The proof follows by splitting on I , the chain rule of
probability, and by definition of the r.v.’s. For any v ∈ V ,
denote i(v) ∈ {0, . . . , k} to be such that v ∈ Vi(v), then
Pr(U = v) =
k∑
i=0
Pr(U = v, I = i)
=
k∑
i=0
Pr(U = v | I = i) · Pr(I = i)
= Pr(U = v | I = i(v)) · Pr(I = i(v))
=
(
1
|Vi(v)|
)
·
(
|Vi(v)| · pi(v)∑k
j=0 |Vj | · pj
)
=
pi(v)∑k
j=0 |Vj | · pj
= pi(v)
= Pr(V = v) .
The penultimate equality follows from
1 =
∑
v′∈V
Pr(V = v′) =
k∑
i=0
∑
v′∈Vi
pi =
k∑
i=0
|Vi| · pi .
This also establishes that the probability mass Pr(I = i) ∝
|Vi| · pi is already normalised.
C. Proof of Proposition 16
The pseudo-inverse of the CDF follows the general case,
while it is easy to show that − logZ, for Z ∼ Unif ([0, 1]),
is distributed as Exp(1). The time complexity corresponds to
both computing the CDF (which need not be stored in its
entirety) and a linear search for its inversion.
D. Proof of Lemma 20
Suppose that graphs G1 and G2 differ in some edge {j, k}
with j and k both in Na ∩ VY (that is, the edge {j, k} would
belong to EY ). Our task is to upper bound the corresponding
change to counts ‖f(G) − f(G′)‖1 resulting from running
query f on the two graphs. There can be at most R choices
of endpoint node i ∈ R for forming 2-hop paths (i, k, j)
affected by the addition/deletion. Similarly there can be at
most R choices of endpoint i ∈ R for paths (i, j, k) affected
by the addition/deletion. For each of these 2R paths the
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Fig. 3. (a): Time of computing 20 random nodes vs.  on Enron data set.
(b): Time of computing 20 random nodes vs.  on PGP data set.
addition/deletion can affect ‖f(G) − f(G′)‖1 by at most 1.
This proves the result.
E. Proof of Lemma 21
There are two ways the addition or removal of an edge can
affect SY . If the edge is the one between endpoints i and j,
then this can change the 1/A2n(i, j) term by at most 1, (from
0 to 1, in the case that the only other connection between i
and j is via a). If the edge is within Na ∩ VY , then it can
affect a 1/A2n(i, j) term by at most 1/2: the denominator is
incremented/decremented by 1 while the denominator must
always be at least 1 as a 2-path must go through a. This can
occur for at most 2 ·(|Na∩VY |−2) terms in the sum, because
they’re paths involving some intermediate node in Y that is
neither i nor j. So overall the change in SY resulting from
the addition or removal of one edge is at most:
∆f ′ = 1 +
2 · (|Na ∩ VY | − 2)
2
= |Na ∩ VY | − 1.
F. Additional Experimental Results
We present the timing analyses for PRIVATEEBC as func-
tion of privacy level. Figure 3(a) and 3(b) show the results for
Enron and PGP data sets which present similar behaviour as
the Facebook data cf. Fig. 2(e).
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